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Abstract. Ethereum smart contracts are an innovation built on top of the blockchain
technology, which provides a platform for automatically executing contracts in an
anonymous, distributed, and trusted way. The problem is magnified by the fact that
smart contracts, unlike ordinary programs, cannot be patched easily once deployed.
It is important for smart contracts to be checked against potential vulnerabilities.
In this work, we propose an alternative approach to automatically identify critical
program paths (with multiple function calls including inter-contract function calls)
in a smart contract, rank the paths according to their criticalness, discard them if
they are infeasible or otherwise present them with user friendly warnings for user
inspection. We identify paths which involve monetary transaction as critical paths,
and prioritize those which potentially violate important properties. For scalability,
symbolic execution techniques are only applied to top ranked critical paths. Our
approach has been implemented in a tool called sCompile, which has been applied
to 36,099 smart contracts. The experiment results show that sCompile is efficient,
i.e., 5 seconds on average for one smart contract. Furthermore, we show that many
known vulnerabilities can be captured if user inspects as few as 10 program paths
generated by sCompile. Lastly, sCompile discovered 224 unknown vulnerabilities
with a false positive rate of 15.4% before user inspection.
Keywords: blockchain · symbolic testing · smart contract.
1 Introduction
Built on top of cryptographic algorithms [1,2,3] and the blockchain technology [4,5,6],
cryptocurrency like Bitcoin has been developing rapidly in recent years. Many believe it
has the potential to revolutionize the banking industry by allowing monetary transactions.
Smart contracts bring it one step further by providing a framework which allows any
contract to be executed in an autonomous, distributed, and trusted way. Smart contracts
thus may revolutionize many industries. Ethereum [7], an open-source, blockchain-based
cryptocurrency, is the first to integrate the functionality of smart contracts. Due to its
enormous potential, its market cap reached at $29.1 billion as of Jun 17th, 2019.
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In essence, smart contracts are computer programs which are automatically executed
on a distributed blockchain infrastructure. A majority of smart contracts in Ethereum are
written in a programming language called Solidity [8]. Like ordinary programs, Solidity
programs may contain vulnerabilities, which potentially lead to attacks. The problem is
magnified by the fact that smart contracts, unlike ordinary programs, cannot be patched
easily once they are deployed on the blockchain.
In recent years, these attacks exploit security vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart con-
tracts and often result in monetary loss. One notorious example is the DAO attack [9],
i.e., an attacker stole more than 3.5 million Ether (about $45 million USD at the time)
from the DAO contract on June 17, 2016.
The problem of analyzing and verifying smart contracts is far from being solved.
Some believe that it will never be, just as the verification problem of traditional pro-
grams. Solidity is designed to be Turing-complete which intuitively means that it is
very expressive and flexible. The price to pay is that almost all interesting problems
associated with checking whether a smart contract is vulnerable are undecidable [10].
Consequently, tools which aim to analyze smart contracts automatically either are not
scalable or produce many false alarms. For instance, Oyente [11] is designed to check
whether a program path leads to a vulnerability or not using a constraint solver to check
whether the path is feasible or not. Due to the limitation of constraint solving techniques,
if Oyente is unable to determine whether the path is feasible or not, the choice is either
to ignore the path (which may result in a false negative, i.e., a vulnerability is missed) or
to report an alarm (which may result in a false alarm).
Besides, we believe that manual inspection is unavoidable given the expressiveness
of Solidity. However, given that smart contracts often enclose many behaviors (which
manifest through different paths), manually inspecting every path is overwhelming. Thus,
sCompile further aims to reduce the manual effort by identifying a small number of
critical paths and presenting them to the user with easy-to-digest information.
Overall, sCompile works as follows:
– sCompile firstly constructs a control flow graph (CFG) which captures all possible
control flow including those due to the inter-contract function calls. sCompile then
systematically generates paths (with a bounded sequence of function calls).
– To address path explosion, sCompile then statically identifies paths which are
‘critical’. In this work, we define paths involving monetary transactions as critical
paths, which is often sufficient in capturing vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
– We then define a set of (configurable) money-related properties based on existing
vulnerabilities and identify all paths that potentially violate our properties. Con-
sidering that different properties have different criticalness and a long path may
be unlikely feasible than a short one, sCompile ranks all paths by computing a
criticalness score for each path based on the two factors.
– Finally, for top ranked paths,sCompile automatically checks whether it is feasible
using symbolic execution techniques. And, the feasible paths are presented to the
user for inspection.
We have implemented sCompile and applied it to 36,099 smart contracts gathered
from EtherScan [12]. Our experiment shows that sCompile can efficiently analyze smart
contracts, i.e., it spends 5 seconds on average to analyze a smart contract (with a bound
on the number of function calls 3). Furthermore, we show that sCompile effectively
prioritizes programs paths which reveal vulnerabilities in smart contracts, i.e., it is
often sufficient to capture the vulnerability by inspecting the reported 10 or fewer
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contract toyDAO{
address owner;
mapping (address => uint) credit;
function toyDAO() payable public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function donate() payable public{
credit[msg.sender] = 100;
}
function withdraw() public {
0 uint256 value = 20;
1 if (msg.sender.call.value(value)()) {
2 credit[msg.sender] = credit[msg.sender] - value;
}
}
}
contract Bitway is ERC20 {
function () public payable {
createTokens();
}
function createTokens() public payable {
require(msg.value > 300);
...
}
...
}
Fig. 1: Illustrative contracts
critical paths. Overall, sCompile identified 224 vulnerabilities. The false positive rate of
sCompile (before the results are reported for user inspection) is 15.4%, which is also
generally acceptable. A further user study result shows that with sCompile’s help, users
are more likely to identify vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates how sCompile works
through a few simple examples. Section 3 presents the details of our approach step-by-
step. Section 4 shows evaluation results on sCompile. Section 5 reviews related work
and lastly Section 6 concludes with a discussion on future work.
2 Illustrative Examples
In this section, we present multiple examples to illustrate vulnerabilities in smart con-
tracts and how sCompile helps to reveal them. The contracts are shown in Fig. 1.
Example 1: Contract toyDAO is an invariant one of DAO contract. Mapping credit
is a map which records a user’s credit amount. Function donate() allows user to top up
its credit with 100 wei (which is a unit of Ether). Function withdraw() by design sends
20 wei to message sender (at line 1) and then updates credit. However, when line 1 is
executed, message sender could call function withdraw() through its fallback function,
before line 2 is executed. Line 1 is then executed again and another 20 wei is sent to
message sender. Eventually, all Ether in this contract’s wallet is sent to message sender.
In sCompile, inspired by common practice in banking industry, assume that the user
sets the limit to be 30. Given the contract, a critical path reported by sCompile is one
which executes line 0, 1, 0, and 1. The path is associated with a warning message
stating that the accumulated amount transferred along the path is more than the limit.
We remark that existing approaches often check such vulnerability through a property
called reentrancy, which often results in false alarms [11,13].
Example 2: Contract Bitway is another token management contract. It receives Ether
(i.e., cryptocurrency in Ethereum) through function createTokens(). Note that this is
possible because function createTokens() is declared as payable. However, there is no
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function in the contract which can send Ether out. Given this contract, sCompile identifies
a list of critical paths for user inspection. The most critical one is a path where function
createTokens() is invoked. Furthermore, it is labeled with a warning message stating that
the smart contract appears to be a “black hole” contract as there is no path for sending
Ether out, whereas this path allows one to transfer Ether into the wallet of the contract.
By inspecting this path and the warning message, the user can capture the vulnerability.
In comparison, existing tools like Oyente [11] and MAIAN [14] report no vulnerability
given the contract. We remark that even although MAIAN is designed to check similar
vulnerability, it checks whether a contract can receive Ether through testing5 and thus
results in a false negative in this case.
Smart 
contract
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control flow graph 
simulating construction
Step 2:
money-related paths
identification
Step 5:
feasibility checking
Step 6:
visualization report 
generation
Report
Step 3:
suspicious monetary 
properties violation checking
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1 2 3 1 2 3
Fig. 2: Overall workflow of sCompile
3 Approach
Fig. 2 shows the overall work flow of sCompile. Firstly, given a smart contract, sCom-
pile constructs a control flow graph (CFG) [15] and systematically enumerates all paths.
Secondly, we identify the monetary paths based on the CFG up to a user-defined bound
on the number of function calls. Thirdly, we analyze each path in order to check whether
it potentially violates any of the pre-defined monetary properties. Next, we compute a
criticalness score for each and rank the paths accordingly. Afterwards, we apply symbolic
execution to filter infeasible critical paths. Lastly, we present the results along with the
associated paths to the user for inspection.
3.1 Constructing CFG
sCompile constructs a CFG for a smart contract (the compiled EVM opcode with a
single entrance for whole and for each function) to capture all possible paths. Formally,
a CFG is a tuple (N,root,E) such that
– N is a set of nodes, where each node is a basic block of opcodes.
– root ∈ N is the first basic block of opcodes.
– E ⊆ N×N is a set of edges, where each edge (n,n′) corresponds to exactly a control
directly from flow n to n′.
We also consider inter-contract functions calls, where there is a CALL to a foreign
function that is assumed to call the current function including third-part contract.
For instance, Fig. 3 shows the CFG of contract toyDAO shown in Fig. 1. Each node is
in the form of Node m n, where m and n are indices of the first and the last opcodes of
the basic block, respectively. The red diamond node at the top is the root node; the blue
5 MAIAN sends a value of 256 wei to the contract deployed in the private blockchain network
4
Node_0_12
Node_13_64
Node_76_80
Node_81_87
withdraw() Node_65_75
Node_92_99Node_88_91
Node_112_162
Node_163_171
Node_305_307
Node_172_304
Node_100_101
Node_102_109
donate()
Node_308_378
Node_110_111
Fig. 3: Control flow graph of the contract toyDAO
rectangle nodes represent the first node of a function. Note that a black oval represents
a node that can be redirected to the root due to inter-contract function calls. The black
solid edges represent the normal control flow. The red dashed edges represent control
flow due to a new function call, e.g., the edge from Node 88 91 to Node 0 12. That
is, for every node n such that n ends with a terminating opcode instruction (i.e., STOP,
RETURN), we introduce an edge from n to root. The red dotted edges represent control
flow due to the inter-contract function call. That is, for every node which ends with a
CALL instruction to an external function, an edge is added from the node to the root.
Given a bound b on the number of function calls, we can systematically unfold the
CFG so as to obtain all paths during which only b or fewer functions are called. For
instance, with a bound 2, the set of paths include all of those which visit Node 81 87 or
Node 102 109 no more than twice.
Statically constructing the CFG is non-trivial due to indirect jumps in the bytecode
generated by the Solidity compiler. For instance, part of bytecode for contract toyDAO is
shown as follows.
........... | .......
92 JUMPDEST | 300 SHA3
93 PUSH2 0x0064 // 100 | 301 DUP2
96 PUSH2 0x0070 // 112 | 303 SSTORE
99 JUMP | 304 POP
|
100 JUMPDEST | 305 JUMPDEST
101 STOP | 306 POP
....... | 307 JUMP
112 JUMPDEST | ........
113 PUSH1 0x00 |
115 PUSH1 0x14 |
....... |
Considering that Solidity compiler use templates and often introduces indirect jumps
(e.g., PUSH), we actually construct CFGs from EVM opcode as follows:
– Disassemble the bytecode to a sequence of opcode instructions.
– Identify all basic blocks (BBL) from the opcode instructions as nodes of a CFG,
where the boundaries among BBLs are branching instructions JUMP and JUMPI,
JUMPDEST, call instructions CALL, and terminal instructions such as RETURN, STOP,
and REVERT.)
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– Connect basic blocks with edges (e.g., direct jumps) which are statically decided
from the opcode instructions.
– Use stack simulation to complete the CFG with edges for indirect jumps.
In the above, whenever there are indirect jumps, their targets cannot be decided by
checking proceeding instructions and we have missing edges. These nodes are known
as dangling blocks and we introduce stack simulation to find the successor of them.
Stack simulation is similar to define-use analysis except that dangling blocks which are
reachable from the entry BBL are processed first. That is, we find all paths from entry
BBL to dangling blocks (e.g., the two paths from Node 0 12 to Node 305 307) and
simulate instructions in each path following semantics of the instruction on the stack.
Note that a dangling block ends with JUMP may have multiple successors in the CFG.
When we reach the JUMP or JUMPI in the dangling block, the content of the top stack
entry shall be determined and we connect the dangling block with BBL which starts at the
address as in the top stack entry. For instance, for dangling block Node 305 307, there
is only one successor Node 100 101 in both paths which is pushed by the instruction at
address 093. We repeat above steps until all dangling blocks are processed.
3.2 Identifying Monetary Paths
Given a bound b on the number of call depth (i.e., the number of function calls) and a
bound on the loop iterations, there are still many paths in the CFG to be analyzed. For
instance, there are 6 paths in the toyDAO contract with a call depth bound of 1 (and
a loop bound of 5) and 1296 with a call depth bound of 4. This is known as the path
explosion problem [16]. In this work, we focus on money-related paths to avoid path
explosion as almost all vulnerabilities [17] are ‘money’-related.
A node is money-related if and only if its BBL contains any of following opcode
instructions: CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. In general, one of these
instructions must be used when Ether is transferred from one account to another. A path
which traverses through a money-related node is considered money-related. 6
3.3 Identifying Property-Violating Paths
Next, sCompile prioritizes paths that violate critical properties. The objective is to
prioritize those paths which may trigger violation of critical properties for user inspection.
The properties are designed based on previously known vulnerabilities and they can be
configured and extended in sCompile.
Property: Respect the Limit. In sCompile, we allow users to set a limit on the amount
of Ether transferred out of the contract’s wallet. For each path, we statically check
whether Ether is transferred out of the wallet and whether the transferred amount is
potentially beyond the limit. To do so, for each path, we use a symbolic variable to
simulate the remaining limit. Each time an amount is transferred out, we decrease the
6 Note that each opcode instruction in EVM is associated with some gas consumption which
technically makes them money-related. Gas[7] is the cost of any transaction that can be utilized
to measure actions on Ethereum platform. However, the gas consumption alone in most cases
does not constitute vulnerabilities and therefore we do not consider them money-related. In
Fig. 3, we visualize money-related nodes with black background (e.g., the node Node 112 162
with a CALL statement msg.sender.call.value(value)()).
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contract StandardToken is Token {
1 function destroycontract(address _to) {
2 require(now > start + 10 days);
3 require(msg.sender != 0);
4 selfdestruct(_to);
5 }
6 ...
7 }
8 contract Problematic is StandardToken { ... }
Fig. 4: Guardless suicide
variable accordingly and check whether the remaining limit is less than zero. If so, the
path potentially violates the property. Note that if we are unable to determine the exact
amount to be transferred , we conservatively assume the limit may be broken.
Property: Avoid Non-Existing Addresses. Any hexadecimal string of length no greater
than 40 is considered a valid (well-formed) address in Ethereum. If a non-existing ad-
dress is used as the receiver of a transfer, the Solidity compiler does not generate any
warning and the contract can be deployed on Ethereum successfully. If a transfer to a
non-existing address is executed, Ethereum automatically registers a new address (after
padding 0s in front of address so that its length becomes 160bits). Because this address
is owned by nobody, no one can withdraw Ether in it since no one has the private key.
For every path which contains instruction CALL or SELFDESTRUCT, sCompile checks
whether the address in the instruction exists or not. This is done with the help of
EtherScan Ethereum [12] (which can check whether an address is registered or not).
A path which sends Ether to a non-existing address is considered to be violating the
property. Currently, to minimize the number of requests to EtherScan, we only query
external transactions, thus may lead to false positives when the address has only internal
transactions. Of course, users can configure sCompile to also check internal transactions.
Property: Guard Suicide. sCompile checks whether a path would result in destructing
the contract without constraints on the date or block number, or the contract ownership.
A contract may be designed to “suicide” (with the opcode SELFDESTRUCT) after certain
date or reaching certain number of blocks, and often by transferring the Ether in the
contract wallet to the owner. A notorious example is Parity Wallet which resulted in an
estimated loss of tokens worthy of $155 million [18].
We thus check whether there exists a path which executes SELFDESTRUCT and whether
its path condition is constituted with constraints on date or block number and contract
owner address. While checking the former is straightforward, checking the latter is
achieved by checking whether the path contains constraints on instruction TIMESTAMP
or BLOCK, and checking whether the path condition compares the variables representing
the contract owner address with other addresses. A path which calls SELFDESTRUCT
without such constraints is considered a violation of the property.
One example is the Problematic contract7 shown in Fig. 4. Contract Problematic
inherits contract StandardToken, where one of functions is destroycontract() allowing
one to destruct contract. sCompile can report that line 4 potentially violates the property.
Property: Be No Black Hole. In a few cases, sCompile analyzes paths which do not
contain CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. For instance, if a contract
has no money-related paths (i.e., never sends any Ether out), sCompile then checks
whether there exists a path which allows contract to receive Ether. The idea is to check
whether contract acts like a black hole for Ether. If it does, it is considered a vulnerability.
7 We hide the names of the contracts as some of them are yet to be fixed.
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To check whether the contract can receive Ether, we check whether there is a payable
function. Since Solidity version 0.4.x, a contract is allowed to receive Ether only if one
of its public functions is declared with the keyword payable. When the Solidity compiler
compiles a non-payable function, the following sequence of opcode instructions are
inserted before the function body.
1 CALLVALUE
2 ISZERO
3 PUSH XX
4 JUMPI
5 PUSH1 0x00
6 DUP1
7 REVERT
At line 1, the instruction CALLVALUE retrieves the message value
(to be received). Instruction ISZERO then checks if the value is zero,
if it is zero, it jumps (through the JUMPI instruction at line 4) to the
address which is pushed into stack by the instruction at line 3; or it
goes to the block starting at line 5, which reverts the transaction (by
instruction REVERT at line 7). Thus, to check whether the contract is
allowed to receive Ether, we go through every path to check whether
it contains the above-mentioned sequence of instructions. If all of
them do, we conclude that the contract is not allowed to receive Ether. Otherwise, it is.
If the contract can receive Ether but cannot send any out, we identify the path for
receiving Ether as potentially violating the property and label it with a warning messaging
stating that the contract is a black hole.
Above properties are designed based on reported vulnerabilities. Of course, sCom-
pile is designed to be extensible, i.e., new properties can be easily supported by providing
a function which takes a path as input and reports whether the property is violated.
To further help users understand paths of a smart contract, sCompile supports addi-
tional analysis. For instance, sCompile provides analysis of gas consumption of paths.
However, without trying out all possible inputs, users may not be aware of the existence
of certain particularly gas consuming paths. The gas consumption of a path is estimated
based on each opcode instruction in the path statically.
3.4 Ranking Program Paths
To allow user to focus on most critical paths and to save analyses efforts, we prioritize
paths according to the likelihood they reveal critical vulnerability. For each path, we
calculate a criticalness score and rank paths according to scores. Criticalness scores are
calculated as follows: let pa be a path and V be the set of properties which pa violates.
criticalness(pa) =
Σpr∈Vαpr
ε ∗bound(pa) (1)
where αpr is a constant which denotes the criticalness of violating property pr, bound(pa)
is the depth bound of path pa (i.e., the number of function calls) and ε is a positive
constant. Intuitively, the criticalness is designed such that the more critical a property
the path violates, the larger the score is; and the more properties it violates, the larger
the score is. Furthermore, it penalizes long paths so that short paths are presented first
for user inspection.
To assess the criticalness of each property, we use the technique called failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA [19]) which is a risk management tool widely used in a
variety of industries. FMEA evaluates each property with 3 factors, i.e., Likelihood,
Severity and Difficulty. Each factor is a value rating from 1 to 3, i.e., 3 for Likelihood
means the most likely; 3 for Severity means the most severe and 3 for Difficulty means
the most difficult to detect. The criticalness αpr is then set as the product of the three
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Table 1: Definition of αpr
transfer limit non-existing addr. suicide black hole
Likelihood 1 1 2 3
Severity 2 3 3 2
Difficulty 2 2 3 2
αpr 4 6 18 12
factors. After ranking, only paths which have a criticalness score larger than certain
threshold are subject to further analysis, reducing the number of paths significantly.
In order to identify the threshold for criticalness, we adapt the k-fold cross-validation[20,21]
idea in statistical area. We collected a large set of smart contracts and split them into a
training data set(10,452 contracts) and a test data set (25,678 contracts). We repeated
the experiments 20 times which took more than 5,700 total hours of all machines and
optimizes those parameters.The adapted parameters are shown in Table 1, and ε is set to
be 1 and the threshold for criticalness is set to be 10.
3.5 Feasibility Checking
Not all the paths are feasible. To avoid such false alarms, we filter infeasible paths
through symbolic execution [22]. The basic idea is to symbolically execute a given
program.Symbolic execution has been previously applied to Solidity programs in
Oyente [11] and MAIAN [14]. In this work, we apply symbolic execution to reduce
the paths which are to be presented for users’ inspection. Only if a path is found to
be infeasible by symbolic execution, we remove it. In comparison, both Oyente and
MAIAN aim to fully automatically analyze smart contracts and thus when a path cannot
be determined by symbolic execution, the result may be a false positive or negative.
contract GigsToken {
1 function createTokens() payable {
2 require(msg.value > 0);
3 uint256 tokens = msg.value.mul(RATE);
4 balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(tokens);
5 owner.transfer(msg.value);
6 }
7 ...
}
Fig. 5: A non-greedy contract
For instance, Fig. 5 shows a contract which is capable of receiving (since the function
is payable) and sending Ether (due to owner.transfer(msg.value) at line 5), and thus
sCompile does not flag it to be a black hole contract. MAIAN however claims that it is. A
closer investigation reveals that because MAIAN has trouble in solving path conditions
for reaching line 5, and thus mistakenly assumes the path is infeasible. As a result, it
believes there is no way Ethers can be sent out and thus the contract is a black hole.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
4.1 Implementation
sCompile is implemented in C++ with about 8K lines of code. The symbolic execution
engine in sCompile is built based on the Z3 SMT solver [23].
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Table 2: Loop bound definitions among three tools
Tool call bound loop bound timeout other bound
sCompile 3 5 60 s 60 cfg nodes
Oyente 1 10 60 s N.A.
MAIAN 3 (no inter-contract) N.A. 60 s 60 cfg nodes
4.2 Experiment
We aim to to answer research questions (RQ) regarding sCompile’s efficiency, effective-
ness and usefulness in practice. Our test subjects contain all 36,099 contracts (including
both the training set and the test set) with Solidity source code downloaded from Ether-
Scan. sCompile can directly take EVM code as input and the source code is used for our
manual inspection for experiment purpose.
All experiment are done on an Amazon EC2 C3 xlarge instance installed with Ubuntu
16.04 and gcc 5.4. The timeout set for sCompile is: global wall time is 60 seconds and
Z3 solver timeout is 100 milliseconds. The limit on the maximum number of blocks for
a single path is set to be 60, and the limit on the maximum iterations of loops is set to be
5, i.e., each loop is unfolded at most five times.
RQ1: Is sCompile efficient enough for practical usage? In this experiment, we
evaluate sCompile in terms of its execution time. We systematically apply sCompile to
all the benchmark programs in the training set.
The results are summarized in Figure 6. In sub-table of Figure 6, the second, third
and fourth row show the execution of sCompile with call depth bound 1, 2, and 3
respectively.For comparison, the fifth row shows the execution time of Oyente (the latest
version 0.2.7) with the same timeout. We remark that the comparison should be taken
with a grain of salt. Oyente does not consider sequences of function calls, i.e., its bound
on function calls is 1. Furthermore, it does not consider initialization of variables in
the constructor (or in the contract itself). The next columns show the execution time of
MAIAN (the latest commit version on Mar 19). Although MAIAN is designed to analyze
paths with multiple (by default, 3) function calls, it does not consider the possibility of a
third-party contract calling any function in the contract through inter-contract function
calls and thus often explores much fewer paths than sCompile. Furthermore, MAIAN
checks only one of the three properties (i.e., suicidal, prodigal and greedy) each time.
Thus, we must run MAIAN three times to check all three properties. The different
bounds used in all three tools are summarized in Table 2.
In sub-table of Figure 6, the second column shows the median execution time and
the third column shows the number of times the execution time exceeds the global wall
time (60 seconds). We observe that sCompile almost always finishes its analysis within
10 second. Furthermore, the execution time remains similar with different call depth
bounds. This is largely due to sCompile’s strategy on applying symbolic execution only
to a small number of top ranked critical paths. We do however observe that the number
of timeouts increases with an increased call depth bound. A close investigation shows
that this is mainly because the number of paths extracted from CFG is much larger and
it takes more time to extract all paths for ranking. In comparison, although Oyente has a
call depth bound of 1, it times out on more contracts and spends more time on average.
MAIAN spends more time on each property than the total execution of sCompile. For
some property (such as Greedy), MAIAN times out fewer times, which is mainly because
it does not consider inter-contract function calls and thus works with a smaller CFG.
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TABLE IV: Comparison on vulnerable contracts
sCompile MAIAN
alarmed true positive false positive alarmed true positive false positive
Avoid non-existing address 37 32 5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Be no black hole 57 57 0 141 56 85
Guard Suicide 42 38 4 66 30 36
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
MAIAN
(Greedy)
MAIAN
(Prodigal)
MAIAN
(Suicidal)
Oyente
(0.2.7)
sCompile
(Call bound=3)
sCompile
(Call bound=2)
sCompile
(Call bound=1)
Fig. 7: execution time on sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN,
with 60s global timeout, 100ms z3 solver timeout and bound
1.
unlike in the case of Oyente and MAIAN. To validate the
conjecture, we count the average number of program paths
which are analyzed through symbolic execution in sCompile.
Table V shows the results. The second column shows the
estimated total number of program paths on average for each
smart contract which is successfully tested within the wall time
limit. Note that the estimation is based on the CFG and thus
may count program paths which are infeasible. This is part
of the reason it is often greater than the number reported by
alternative methods like [8], [10]. The other part is that our
CFG is more complete by considering a more conservative
inter-procedural calls. The third column shows the average
number of paths analyzed with symbolic execution. It can be
observed that only a small fraction of the program paths are
symbolically analyzed. Furthermore, the number of symboli-
cally executed paths remain small even when the call depth
bound is increased. This is because only the top ranked critical
program paths are analyzed by symbolic execution. If there
are multiple program paths which potentially violate the same
property, sCompile prioritizes the shorter one and often avoids
symbolically executing the longer one. The results confirm our
conjecture.
TABLE V: Average number of program paths
in total symbolic-executed to user
call depth 1 48.92 37.51 1.49
call depth 2 6177.21 144.24 12.46
call depth 3 31346.62 121.23 12.62
In the second experiment, we aim to investigate the
effectiveness of sCompile. We manually inspect the critical
paths reported by sCompile to check whether the program
path, together with the associated warning message, reveals a
true vulnerability in the contract. Note that not all properties
checked by sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. For
instance, given a user-set transfer limit, sCompile may report
that a program path may violate the transfer limit. Although
such information is often useful, depending on the transfer
limit set by the user, the program path may or may not
signal a vulnerability. For instance, a gambling contract may
allow a user to place a bet with certain amount and transfer
some amount back to the user when the betting result is
revealed. In such a case, the transfer limit is likely broken
if a large bet is placed by the user. For another instance,
sCompile automatically reports a program path which is the
most gas-consuming. Such information is useful for the user
(e.g., to set the right ‘price’ for the transaction). It however
does not necessarily signal a vulnerability (although it may
signal program bugs). We thus focus on those results produced
by sCompile which are directly related to vulnerabilities in
the following, i.e., program paths which are deemed to violate
property “avoid non-existing addresses”, “be no black hole”
and “guard suicide”. Note that two of the properties (i.e., the
latter two) analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as
well. We can thus compare sCompile’s performance with that
of MAIAN for these two properties. The results are shown
in Table IV. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings.
For Property 2: Be no Black Hole, there are 57 contracts
alarmed by sCompile. We manually checked all these contracts
and confirm that they are all true positives. In comparison,
MAIAN identified 141 black hole contracts and 56 contracts
among them are true positives, 43 of which overlap with
sCompile’s results. We then investigate why sCompile missed
the remaining 13 contracts identified by MAIAN. We dis-
covered all of them took more than 60 seconds and thus
sCompile timed out before finishing analyzing. When we set
the timeout to 200s, sCompile successfully identifies 3 more as
black hole contracts. But the other 10 are stopped by contracts
with mass of money-related paths which leads to timeout at
last.
median(s) tim out #
sCompile
(Call bound = 1) 3.106 1145
sCompile
(Call bound = 2) 8.717 1737
sCompile
(Call bound = 3) 5.267 2597
Oyente 18.015 2223
MAIAN
(Suicidal) 19.053 1561
MAIAN
(Prodigal) 23.472 6186
MAIAN
(Greedy) 19.397 1081
Fig. 6: Execution time of sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN
Table 3: Average number of program paths
In total Symbolic-executed To user
call depth 1 48.92 37.51 1.49
call depth 2 6177.21 144.24 12.46
call depth 3 31346.62 121.23 12.62
The sub-figure in Figure 6 visualizes the distribution of execution time f the tools in
plot-box. The x-axis represents the execution time (in seconds). From the figure, we can
conclu e that sCompile is effici nt.
Table 3 shows the statistics on the number of processed paths, including the estimated
total number of paths on average (in the second column), the number of symbolic-
executed (based on CFG), and the number asse to users. It c be obs rved that only
a small fraction of the paths are symbolically analyzed. Furthermore, the number of
symbolica ly executed paths remain small even wh n th c ll depth bound is increased.
This is because only the top ranked critical paths are analyzed by symbolic execution.
RQ2: Is sCompile effective to practical usage? In the second experiment, we aim to
investigate the effectiveness of sCompile. We apply sCompile to all 36,099 contracts
and manually inspect the critical paths reported by sCompile to check whether the path,
together with the associated warning message, reveals a true vulnerability in the contract.
Note that not all properties checked by sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. We only
focus on those results produced by sCompile which are directly related to vulnerabilities
in the following, i.e., paths which are deemed to violate property “avoid non-existing
addresses”, “be no black hole” and “guard suicide”. Note that two of the properties (i.e.,
the latter two) analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as well. We can thus
compare sCompile’s performance with that of MAIAN for these two properties. The
results are shown in Table 4. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings8.
8 We have informed all developers whose contact info are available about the vulnerabilities in
their contracts and several have confirmed the vulnerabilities and deployed new contracts to
substitute the vulnerable ones. Some are yet to respond, although the balance in their contracts
are typically small.
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Table 4: Comparison on vulnerable contracts
sCompile MAIAN
alarmed true positive false positive alarmed true positive false positive
Avoid non-existing address 37 32 5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Be no black hole 57 57 0 141 56 85
Guard suicide 42 38 4 66 30 36
contract MiCarsToken {
function killContract () payable external {
if (msg.sender==owner ||
msg.value >=howManyEtherInWeiToKillContract)
selfdestruct(owner);
}
...
}
Fig. 7: Ambiguous cases between sCompile and MAIAN
For Property: Be no Black Hole, there are 57 contracts in the training set are marked
vulnerable by sCompile. We manually confirmed that they are all true positives. In
comparison, MAIAN identified 141 black hole contracts and 56 contracts among them
are true positives, 43 of which overlap with sCompile’s results. For 13 missed contracts
by sCompile but detected by MAIAN, all of them took more than 60 seconds and thus
sCompile timed out before finishing analyzing.
The other 85 identified by MAIAN are false positives and 62 of them are library
contracts. We randomly choose 5 contracts from the remaining for further investigation.
We find Z3 could not finish solving the path condition in time and thus MAIAN conser-
vatively marks the contract as vulnerable. After extending the time limit for Z3 and total
timeout, 4 of the 5 false positives are still reported. The reason is that these contracts can
only send Ether out after certain period, and MAIAN could not find a feasible path to
send Ether out for such cases, and mistakenly flags contract as a black hole.
For Property: Guard Suicide, sCompile reports a program path if it leads to SELFDESTRUCT,
without a constraint on the ownership of the contract or the date or the block number,
i.e., a guard to prevent an unauthorized users from killing the contract. Among the
analyzed contracts, sCompile identified 42 contracts which contain at least one path
which violates the property. Many of the identified contracts violate the property due to
contract inheritance as shown in Fig. 4.
The remaining 4 cases reported by sCompile are false positives. We manually investi-
gated into them and found that they belong to two uncommon coding cases (where 3
of them are originated from the same contract) and three of them can be detected by
sCompile by slightly revising its implementation.
MAIAN identified 66 contracts violating the property. 30 of them are true positives, 13
of which are also identified by sCompile. The other 36 are false positives. The contract
MiCarsToken shown in Fig. 7 shows a typical false alarm. There are 2 constraints before
SELFDESTRUCT in the contract. sCompile considers such a contract safe for there is
a guard of msg.sender == owner (or the other condition), whereas MAIAN reports a
vulnerability as the contract can also be killed if the msg.sender is not the owner when
the second condition is satisfied.
We further analyzed the 17 cases which were neglected by sCompile. 6 of them are
alarmed for owner change as exemplified in Fig. 8. In this contract, selfdestruct is well
guarded, but the developer makes a mistake so that the constructor becomes a normal
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contract Mortal {
address public owner;
function mortal() { owner = msg.sender; }
function kill() {
if (msg.sender == owner) suicide(owner); }
}
Fig. 8: Contract of owner change
function, and anyone can invoke mortal() to make himself the owner of this contract and
kill the contract.
For Property: Avoid Non-existing Address. For the contracts in the training set, all
addresses identified are of length 160 bits. However, there are 37 contracts identified as
non-existing addresses (i.e., not registered in Ethereum mainnet). They may be used for
different reasons. For example, in contract AmbrosusSale, the address of TREASURY
does not exist before the function specialPurchase() or processPurchase() is
invoked (which will cost more gas for its first user). And there are 5 addresses registered
by internal transactions.
We further analyzed 25,647 contracts newly uploaded in EtherScan from February
2018 to July 2018. For “Be no Black Hole”, there are 109 vulnerabilities out of 139
alarms generated by sCompile. Applying MAIAN on these contracts, 84 of them are
marked vulnerable, 77 of which are true vulnerabilities overlapping with those found
by sCompile and 7 library contracts are marked vulnerable mistakenly. Among the
139 contracts, 25 vulnerable ones are missed by MAIAN according to our manual
check. For “Guard Suicide”, there are 83 vulnerabilities out of 114 alarms generated by
sCompile. Applying MAIAN on these contracts, 42 are marked vulnerable, all of which
overlap with those found by sCompile. For “Avoid Non-existing Addresses”, there are
80 vulnerabilities out of 87 alarms generated by sCompile. The 7 false alarms are due to
internal transactions.
In total, sCompile identifies 224 vulnerabilities from the 36,099 contracts consisting of
46 Black Hole vulnerabilities, 66 Guardless Suicide vulnerabilities and 112 Non-existing
Address vulnerabilities.
RQ3: Is sCompile useful to contract users? Different from other tools which aim to
fully automatically analyze smart contracts, sCompile is designed to facilitate human
users. We thus conduct a user study to see whether sCompile is helpful to them.
The study takes the form of an online test. Once a user starts the test, first the user is
briefed with necessary background on smart contract vulnerabilities (with examples).
Then, 6 smart contracts (selected at random each time from a pool of contracts) are
displayed one by one. For each contract, the source code is first shown. Afterwards, the
user is asked to analyze the contract and answer the two questions. The first question
asks what is the vulnerability the contract has. The second question requires user to
identify the most gas consuming path in contract (with one function call).
For the first three contracts, the outputs from sCompile are shown alongside the
contract source code as a hint to the user. For the remaining 3 contracts, the hints are not
shown. The contracts are randomized so that not the same contracts are always displayed
with the hint. The goal is to check whether users can identify the vulnerabilities correctly
and more efficiently with sCompile’s results.
We distribute the test through social networks and online professional forums. We also
distribute it through personal contacts who we know have some experience with Solidity
smart contracts. In three weeks we collected 48 successful responses to the contracts
13
Table 5: Statistics and results of surveyed contractsContract LOC #paths Q1 Q2 Time Usefulness
C1 (w) 33 8 7/8 3/8 119
5
C2 (w) 52 16 7/8 2/8 98
C3 (w) 67 38 7/8 2/8 233
C4 (w/o) 87 59 2/8 1/8 414
C5 (w/o) 103 13 3/8 1/8 397
C6 (w/o) 107 27 4/8 1/8 420
(without junk answers)9. Table 5 summarizes the results. Recall that sCompile’s results
are presented for the first three contracts. Column LOC and #paths shows the number
of lines and paths in each contract. Note that in order to keep the test manageable, we
are limited to relatively small contracts in this study. Columns Q1 and Q2 show the
number of correct responses (the numerator) out of the number of valid responses (the
denominator). We collect the time (in seconds) taken by each user in the Time column
to answer all the questions. In the end of the survey we ask the user to give us a score
(on the scale of 1 to 7, the higher the score the more useful our tool is) on how useful
the hints in helping them answer the questions. The value in column Usefulness is the
average score over all responses because all responses are shown half the hints.
The results show that for the first three contracts for which sCompile’s analysis results
are shown, almost all users are able to answer Q1 correctly using less time. For the
last three contracts without the hints, most of the users cannot identify the vulnerability
correctly and it takes more time for them to answer the question. For identifying the
most gas-consuming path, even with the hints on which function takes the most gas,
most of the users find it difficult in answering the question, although with sCompile’s
help, more users are able to answer the question correctly. The results show that gas
consumption is not a well-understood problem and highlight the necessity of reporting
the condition under which maximum gas consumption happens. All the users think our
tool is useful (average score is 5/7) in helping them identify the problems.
5 Related work
sCompile is related to existing work on identifying vulnerabilities in smart contracts that
can be roughly categorized into 3 groups according to the level at which the vulnerability
resides at: Solidity-level, EVM-level, and blockchain-level [17]. In addition, existing
work can be categorized according to the techniques they employ to find vulnerabilities:
symbolic execution [11,14,24,25,26], static-analysis based approaches [27] and formal
verification [13,28]. Our approach works at the EVM-level and is based on static analysis
and symbolic execution, and is thus closely related to the following work.
Oyente [11] formulates the security bugs as intra-procedural properties and uses
symbolic execution to check these properties. However, Oyente does not perform inter-
procedural analyses to check inter-procedural or trace properties as did in sCompile.
MAIAN [14] is recently developed to find three types of problematic contracts in
the wild: prodigal, greedy and suicidal. It formulates the three types of problems as
inter-procedural properties and performs bounded inter-procedural symbolic execution.
9 There are about 80 people who tried the test. Most of the respondents however leave the test
after the first question, which perhaps evidences the difficulty in analyzing smart contracts.
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It builds a private testnet to valid whether the contracts found by it are true positives
by executing the contracts with data generated by symbolic execution. However, sCom-
pile differs from MAIAN in following aspects. First, sCompile makes a much more
conservative assumption about a call to third-party contract which we assume can call
back a function in current contract. sCompile is designed to reduce user effort rather
than to analyze smart contracts fully automatically. Secondly, sCompile supports more
properties than MAIAN. Thirdly, sCompile checks properties in ways which are different
from MAIAN. Other symbolic execution based tools [24,25] perform intra-procedural
symbolic analysis directly on the EVM bytecode as what Oyente does.
The tool Securify [27] is based on static analysis to analyze contracts. It specifies both
compliance and violation patterns for the property. The vulnerability detection problem
is then reduced to search the patterns on the inferred data and control dependencies
information. The use of compliance pattern reduces the number of false positives in the
reported warnings. In the ranking algorithm, our approach rely on syntactic information
to reduce paths for further symbolic analysis to improve performance. We analyze the
extracted paths with symbolic execution which is more precise than the pure static
analysis as adopted by Securify.
Other attempts on analyzing smart contracts include formal verification using either
model-checking techniques [13] or theorem-proving approaches [28]. They in theory can
check arbitrary properties specified manually in a form accepted by the model checker
or the theorem prover. It is known that model checking has limited scalability whereas
theorem proving requires an overwhelming amount of user effort.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a practical approach named sCompile to reveal “money-related“ paths in
smart contract and to further detect vulnerabilities among critical ones. In our experi-
ment among 36,099 smart contracts, it detected 224 new vulnerabilities. All the new
vulnerabilities are well defined in our approach and could be presented to the user in
well-organized information within a reasonable time frame. A comparison with two
existing approaches also demonstrated that sCompile is both efficient and effective.
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